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Just war theory exists to stop armies and countries from using armed force without good cause. But how
can we judge whether a war is just? In this book John W. Lango aims to develop a set of cosmopolitan just war
principles for all forms of armed conflict, arguing that the more traditional state-centric just war theory should be both
globalised and democratised. Alexander Leveringhaus finds some interesting insights here and recommends the
book to researchers in political and moral philosophy, but finds that it lacks some elegance in prose as there is a fair
amount of repetition.
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In recent years, just war theory has witnessed a remarkable intellectual revival.
Predominantly a phenomenon in English-speaking philosophical circles,
contemporary just war theory has tackled many pressing issues relating to the
use of armed force with increasing philosophical sophistication, drawing upon
insights from other philosophical subfields, such as political theory, legal theory,
and bioethics. John W. Lango’s latest book is best viewed against this
background.
Mirroring recent debates on global justice in political theory, contemporary just
war theory can be roughly divided into non-cosmopolitan and cosmopolitan
approaches. In a nutshell, the former approach attaches moral significance to
communal and state boundaries, whereas the latter, upholding an ideal of world
citizenship, deems borders morally irrelevant. As its title suggests, Lango’s book
is committed to the second perspective.
In order to develop a cosmopolitan just war theory, Lango starts with a lengthy methodological discussion. First, he
seeks to strike a balance between the abstractions of moral theory and the concrete dilemmas experienced during
armed conflict. He does so by employing a method akin to John Rawls’ famous ‘reflective equilibrium’ (see A Theory
of Justice). In order to reason about the ethics of war, Lango thinks one must render coherent comprehensive moral
principles (e.g. autonomy), just war principles, and judgements about particular conflicts via a process of mutual
adjustment. The result of this critical process, he claims, is a revisionist just war theory that challenges more
traditional ideas, most notably that just war theory should be state-centric.
Secondly, like many other contemporary just war theorists (Cecile Fabre, F.M. Kamm, Jeff McMahan, and David
Rodin), Lango approaches armed conflict from a deontological perspective. The rightness and wrongness of military
action, he assumes, does not solely depend on its consequences. Although much of what Lango has to say about
moral theory is not radically new, his discussion of deontology draws attention to an interesting yet often neglected
issue. Deontological moral theories, and Kantianism in particular, emphasise the importance of an agent’s
intentions. To illustrate the point, terrorism, some deontologists argue, is bad precisely because terrorists intend to
harm innocent individuals in order to achieve their aims. If this is true, a terrorist act potentially differs from a
legitimate military strike against, say, an enemy’s weapons factory in which harm is unintentionally yet foreseeable
inflicted on non-combatants as a side-effect of the destruction of the factory. Lango rightly points out that there are
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many instances in armed conflict in which a warring party knowingly yet unintentionally harms individuals. A drone
pilot, for example, who targets a suspected terrorist in a busy market square may not intend to harm any
bystanders, but he knowingly imposes the risk of death or injury on them.
In response, deontological just war theory, Lango contends, must also take into account the levels of risk warring
parties may permissibly, and knowingly, impose on individuals in the course of a military campaign. Some risky
operations, if conducted negligently or recklessly, may violate moral rules, even if any resulting harms are not
inflicted intentionally. Lango even goes so far to claim that the mere exposure to an unreasonable level of risk at the
hands of another party constitutes a form of harm, even if the risk does not, in the end, materialise. While much of
what he has to say on risk deserves to be taken up in future discussion, he makes this particular argument appear
less controversial than it is. A detailed defence of the relationship between ‘risking’ and ‘harming’ would have been
useful.
But the action lies, of course, not in the methodological analysis alone but in Lango’s discussion of cosmopolitanism.
Given its deontological foundations, it is hardly surprising that Lango’s cosmopolitanism is individualistic and rights-
based. Military action should be understood as the defence of individual human rights. However, more needs to be
said about the distinctive contribution cosmopolitanism can make here. After all, human rights are at the centre of
contemporary just war theory, even in the works of non-cosmopolitan thinkers, such as Michael Walzer and John
Rawls. To reply to this charge, Lango can point to the overall revisionist aspect of his project. Compared to Walzer’s
and Rawls’, his theory is less state-centric. On the one hand, and continuing a familiar theme in cosmopolitan
writing, Lango wants to strengthen and reform international institutions, especially the UN Security Council. This is a
sensible argument, though one suspects that those studying International Relations might take issue with it. On the
other hand, he thinks that cosmopolitan just war principles can guide the actions of all individuals, including ordinary
citizens and leaders of non-state movements. In particular, individuals qua cosmopolitan citizens of the world should,
when reasoning about the use of armed force, take into account the perspectives of non-members of their
community. This seems desirable, especially because politicians are quick to denounce the enemy’s goals, but the
overall repercussions are not clear. Does this ‘global’ perspective mean that one merely understands the motives of
one’s enemies? Or does it mean that one’s enemies may, under certain circumstances, also have a just cause, or at
least some legitimate goals? The possibility that both parties may have a just cause warrants further scrutiny.
The biggest challenge that cosmopolitanism poses to just war thinking, however, lies in its assumption that
boundaries do not carry moral weight. In the debate on global justice, non-cosmopolitans usually argue that there is
a special relationship between compatriots, which cosmopolitans deny. Applied to just war theory, cosmopolitanism
has radical repercussions, especially when lives are weighted against each other. For it suggests that communal
affiliations should not have an impact on these calculations. Lango recognises this when he argues that bad and
good results in armed conflict must be distributed according to a fairness standard. The notion of risk, again, is
crucial here. But the book would have benefitted from an analysis of the reasons that can legitimately be given for
departing from an egalitarian distribution of risk in particular, and harm more generally.
Overall, the book lacks some elegance in prose as there is a fair amount of repetition. The fact that the individual
chapters are divided into many, and sometimes rather short, subparts does not make things easier for the reader.
Stylistic quibbles aside, there are some interesting insights here and the book is recommended to researchers in
political and moral philosophy.
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